The aim of this paper is to examine whether shareholders consider the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as value-relevant for the participating firms. An analysis is conducted of the share prices changes as caused by the first publication of compliance data in April, 2006, which disclosed an over-allocation of emission allowances. Through an event study, it is shown that share prices actually increased as a result of the allowance price drop when firms have a lower carbon-intensity of production and larger allowance holdings. There was no significant value impact from firms' allowance trade activity or from the pass-through of carbon-related production costs (carbon leakage). The conclusion is that the EU ETS does 'bite'. The main impact on the share prices of firms arises from their carbon-intensity of production. The EU ETS is thus valued as a restriction on pollution.
Introduction
To meet its greenhouse gas emission targets, the European Union (EU) has introduced in through which the carbon price drop impacted the EU ETS firms. The methodology will be discussed in Section 4. The empirical results and a discussion thereof will be presented in Sections 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature review
With an abundant supply of allowances one may expect the regulation did not affect the and that some firms did reduce emissions. Abrell et al. (2011) found that the profit margins of over-allocated firms were positively affected, et vice versa. Furthermore, the market valuations of firms were responsive to the carbon price. For example, Oestreich and Tsiakas (2012) analyse the "carbon premium", defined as the share price return difference of dirty versus clean firms. They find that this premium is higher for dirtier firms. However, when focusing on energy companies in the EU, Koch and Bassen (2013) find the opposite, namely that dirtier firms have higher costs of capital due to carbon related risks and thus a lower equity value. Moreover, through an event study on the April 2006 carbon price drop, Bushnell et al. (2013) shows that the market values of dirtier non-energy industries declined more, i.e. dirtier firms were more heavily penalized, as was found for the energy industry in Koch and Bassen (2013) . 3 Among energy firms, however, the impact was the opposite, i.e. being cleaner will be penalized, as with Oestreich and Tsiakas (2012).
This study contributes to the literature through the inclusion of the firms' allowance purchases and sales from the EU ETS database: the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL). Only three studies have analysed these EU ETS transactions. Both Jaraitė and Kažukauskas (2012) and Zaklan (2013) examine determinants in purchasing and selling
allowances. Yet, to our knowledge the impact of these transactions on share prices has not been analysed yet.
Bushnell et al. (2013) also conduct an event study on the same allowance price fall in the EU ETS. However, our paper is different from theirs. First, where Bushnell et al. (2013) make an industry comparison by focusing on power versus non-power industries, we use a more specific categorization of industries to test the effect of the allowance price fall on share prices. Second, contrary to Bushnell et al. (2013) we bring the buying and selling of allowances, which is the very essence of emissions trading, into the analysis, by incorporating such purchases and sales into a number of hypotheses. Third, as a result our conclusions partly reproduce but also partly differ from theirs, which enhances the validity of both studies and adds new insights to this carbon market event.
The literature thus shows that the ex-post results are mixed on the impacts of overallocation and of carbon-intensive production, and that there is a literature gap regarding the effects of allowance trade on share prices. This paper fills these gaps by incorporating allowance trade with the allocation and the product market in determining the EU ETS impact on share prices. In the next section hypotheses are formulated on the interplay of these three factors.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Several related effects on firms' market values occur simultaneously with a change in the carbon price. The three main effects, discussed below, are: (1) carbon leakage and carbonintensity effects, (2) exposure and borrowing effects, and (3) trade effects.
Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects
Carbon-intensive production becomes less attractive in an emissions trading scheme. Hence, if firms can pass-through less than 100% of their carbon-related costs, a drop in the carbon price increases the market value of such firms.
However, if firms can pass on at least 100%, i.e. they do not suffer from carbon leakage, the carbon price drop decreases product revenues, profits and thus their market values. 4 Indeed, Oberndorfer (2009) finds a positive share-price-to-carbon-price relationship for European power firms. The carbon cost margin, i.e. the carbon price times the emissions per unit of production, is higher for firms with a dirtier production. Product prices of dirtier firms will thus decrease more when the carbon price drops, lowering their profits and thus their share prices. Contrary to H.1, the impact for dirty versus clean firms is thus the opposite.
As a result, the second hypothesis H.2 is that: 
Methodology

Abnormal share returns
In order to estimate the market valuation effects around the carbon price shock, we use an event study. This approach was introduced by Fama et al. (1969) initially for corporate finance purposes, but has also been applied within the field of regulatory economics.
The event study methodology implicitly assumes the market is efficient: all available information impacting future profits of firms is discounted into the share prices. If an event is significant for a firm it should thus be possible to extract from its share price the firm-specific returns associated with the event. 5 Subsequently, these "abnormal returns" can be analysed by relating them to these firm's characteristics. Here the firms' industry categories, revenues, allocations, emissions, and allowance purchases and sales will be considered.
For obtaining the market returns the Return Index (RI) was used from Datastream. 6 With RI the returns r i,t can be calculated by first-differencing its natural logarithm:
where i stands for the company i = 1,…, N and i = m denotes the market index. These market portfolio returns r m,t are proxied by the RI of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EU equity market index. The subscript t stands for the trading day. As Figure 1 shows, the start of the event window is to be pinpointed at the 24 th as it is the last day the price moved upwards. And since the price fall took off from the 25 th we consider it the day of the event, i.e. for which t = 0. 7 The inclusion of the 24 th , i.e. for which t = -1, allows for the effects of prior information on the share prices. The event window should not encompass too many days as that may affect the degree of bias of the statistical analysis, but with too few days the impact of the event may not be captured (e.g. Campbell et al., 1997).
We therefore devise three event windows: one with the 26 th of April (t 1 = {-1,1}), one with the 27 th (t 2 = {-1,2}), and one with the 28 th (t 3 = {-1,3}).
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In order to estimate the "abnormal" returns caused by the event a business-as-usual estimate is needed. This estimate was determined by running, for each firm, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: 
The error term ε i,t represents the abnormal returns (AR i,t ). It is standard to aggregate these returns over the event window. Since if these returns are significantly affected during the event window, they will not revolve around zero but maintain a new level. For t 1 , for example, these cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) can be calculated by summing AR i,t from t = -1 to t = 1. 
Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects
Exposure and borrowing effects
Regarding the value effects associated with allocations and emissions two effects are H.3 will then be accepted if exp i is negatively related to CAR i .
For the stock valuation effect, we devised a net holding estimate which takes into account 1) the possibility for firms to borrow, and 2) the net allowances sales -since, at 
Trade effects
Investors may value firms that are active at trading allowances, irrespective of whether they are buying or selling. The estimate we adopted is the trade-intensity (called: tradeintens i ) 13 : 
In addition, a dummy variable notrade i is defined equaling 1 for firms which had nor purchases nor sales, and zero otherwise.
Hypothesis H.5 suggests market values increase the larger the firms' shares in the allowance trade. For H.5 to be accepted tradeintens i needs to be positively related to CAR i . Table I shows the numbers of accountholders (and installations) divided over the listed and non-listed firms. 
Results and discussion
Firm and industry selection criteria
Cumulative abnormal returns
The share prices, which determined the abnormal returns, are themselves established at the end of each trading day. These prices should thus reflect the carbon price changes on t = 0 for the initial decline and on t = 1 for the acceleration of the fall (cf. Figure 1 ). Figure 2 shows the path of the full sample average abnormal returns (ARs, not CARs) over an event window of t = {-2,3}. This event window illustrates that before and until t = 0, the abnormal returns gravitated to the negative. The initial and positive response to the news came at t = 1, suggesting investors belatedly realized the information had an impact on the firms' valuations. The market re-evaluated this shock (downwards) at t = 2. And it took another day for the ARs to tend back to zero, indicating the impact was not substantial overall. We thus expect event window t 1 = {-1,1} to be informative as it includes the initial response to the news. Other event windows we consider are t 2 = {-1,2} and t 3 = {-1,3} which provide insights into the share price corrections the days after. 2,91% 2,58% 3,99% 3,07% 2,98% 2,58% 2,03% 2,45% 2,78% Median -0,25% -0,58% -0,05% 0,62% -0,45% -0,30% -0,72% 1,94% -0,17% Minimum -13,07% -6,99% -13,07% -2,14% -8,42% -6,98% -2,31% -1,14% -11,55% 
Figure 2: Full sample average abnormal returns within event window t = {-2,3}
Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects
The first section of Table III shows the full sample statistics on carbon leakage and the carbon-intensity of production. 22 The variable carbintens, or the amount of emissions per unit of revenues, has an average of 0,04%. This implies that, on average, there is one tonne of positive CARs were to be expected, given their carbon leakage.
Furthermore, Table IV shows that the average carbon-intensity is larger for firms without carbon leakage (0,05%) than for those with carbon leakage (0,03%). This is mainly due to the relatively high carbon-intensity of Sector 1 (0,28%). Without sector 1 the statistics point out that, when subject to carbon leakage, firms produce with a relatively higher carbonintensity. That these surpluses were not subsequently sold off is an indication that many did not foresee the carbon price drop. On the other hand, the picture from borrow may be distorted.
Exposure and borrowing effects
Our data only contains transactions from the spot market but not the derivatives market.
Firms which purchased allowances on the spot market and sold them (at higher prices) through forwards and futures thus appear as not having foreseen the carbon price drop, while they actually may have profited from it via the derivatives market. This may be the case for three firms (Barclays PLC, AB Electrolux, and Severn Trent PLC) which had highly negative borrow values.
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The sector perspective on exp and borrow is provided in the second section of Table   IV . For most sectors the averages differ from their sector ratios, but the signs do not. The result remains that all except sector 1 (Power & Heat) are long on allowances. Interestingly, the full sample average of 11% differs from the full sample sector ratio for the EU ETS of -1%. It implies that, on average, firms are long but on the whole the EU ETS is short. This number is close to the range of the EU ETS allocation estimations from Ellerman and
Buchner (2008) and Anderson and Di Maria (2011). These were in the order of +0,6% and -0,5%, respectively. Hence, although the number is small, in aggregate the listed firms faced pressure to reduce their pollution.
The sector values for borrow are in accordance with those of Table III 
Trade effects
The last statistics in Table III 
Cross-sectional regression
In the OLS regressions the statistics point to a non-normal distribution of the residuals.
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Normality of residuals, though, is not a sufficient condition for obtaining consistent estimates. In order to test whether the assumptions of the regression models are correct, Long There are five hypotheses to test over three event windows. 25 We group the variables in four blocks related to these hypotheses. Then we take up all significant variables in a subsequent regression. In Table V the OLS results with robust clustered standard errors are provided for the three windows. 26 The two specification tests do not point towards a misspecification of the estimated model.
A first inference one can make is that the fit of the model is weak, given the low (adjusted) R-squared. Yet, this is to be expected since the carbon price effect only indirectly relates to share prices. There can always be non-EU ETS related factors playing a role in determining the share price movements, e.g. changes in the macro-economic environment.
And unlike the selected EU ETS variables, it may well be that the EU ETS impact on share prices manifests itself through other channels. For example, a firm's state of abatement technology and business strategy regarding climate change regulation, i.e. factors which are hardly measurable. Related to that, the carbon price shock may have changed investors' expectations on the EU ETS future stringency, and that the carbon price drop induced In one respect it is surprising that the trade variables do not come up in the regressions. As listed firms normally manage their currency exposure, it is probable they do that for their carbon exposure as well. And as the carbon market was relatively new and carbon prices were high, market traders could have engaged in profitable trading strategies.
Although they may have done so, it had no discernible effect on share prices. Nevertheless, it is also not surprising this carbon trade effect is missing. 
Conclusion
Did EU ETS firms' shareholders interpret the April 2006 carbon price drop as significant and, if so, how did the event's impact differ among firms' allocations and transactions?
Through an event study the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), i.e. the event-induced share price returns, were derived from a sample of exchange-listed firms participating in the EU ETS. The CARs statistics indicate that shareholders interpreted the event as having negative value-relevance. In that sense, the EU ETS did 'bite'.
For the share price responsiveness to the EU ETS three groups of variables were checked: 1) the product's carbon-intensity and carbon leakage, 2) the short and medium-term allowance holdings, and 3) the trade in allowances. The results indicate that the product's carbon-intensity and medium-term allowance holdings were, respectively, negatively and positively related to the firms' share prices. As to the medium-term allowance holdings, we expected that the carbon price drop would increase the profits for firms having allowances shortages, et vice versa. Since we found opposite results, the market possibly incorporates a longer time horizon than expected. With future expected stringency of the EU ETS, firms are considered more competitive with lower carbon-intensity rates and larger allowance holdings as both are signals of better abatement capacities. The EU ETS is thus valued as a restriction on pollution.
Finally, the firms' trade activity in allowances was not value-relevant. This result may well be the consequence of investors lacking sufficient data on the firms' allowance trade. A valuation will then be difficult to make when it is not known whether firms e.g. borrowed or stockpiled unused allowances. The market will therefore benefit if the European Commission increases the frequency of publications of the emissions of firms and their allowance transfers.
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- However, as Figure 1 shows, the carbon price fall had already started between the 24 th and 25 th . 9 Five days in between the estimation and event window is allowed for to prevent events affecting the event window. 10 The Orbis database does not provide the percentage of revenues attributable to a firm's installation(s). Firms having relatively more installations outside the EU ETS thus seem to have 'clean' output. Their lower exposure indeed enables them to switch production to the non-EU ETS installations.
11 For several firms, we relied on revenue data from Datastream in case Orbis was not able to provide it. 12 As the NAPs predetermined most of the allocations for Phase I it should pose less of a problem to assume that 14 As mentioned in Section 4.3, it could not be discerned whether the allowances received from or surrendered to the national registries were part of 2005 or 2006 tranches. Some installations received allowances more than twice, suggesting these were corrections rather than allocations. We thus opted for the verified emissions to be included in the analysis. 15 An overview of the NACE industries, its EU ETS sectors and carbon leakage categorization is available on request. 16 For cases where the NACE industry text descriptions closely resembled those of the carbon leakage descriptions, we allocated them to the carbon leakage list. 18 More than half of firms are in sector 8, the residual category. Relatively few firms within sectors 1 to 7 were publicly listed. And if we relied on primary or secondary NACE codes instead of core codes, some companies are active in more sectors. 19 We leave sectors 6 and 7 out of the discussion due to the small number of observations. 20 The net effect consists of firms with a positive and a negative event effect. The negative effect amounts to € -109,5 billion and the positive effect to € 55.6 billion. 21 We assume firms used ( Table III and Table IV below provide these statistics on different numbers of firms. Of the total amount of 393 firms, 16 firms had zero allocations so that exp and borrow could not be determined; 27 firms had zero emissions so that carbintens and carbileak could not be determined. 23 Relative to their purchases and sales, their allocations and emissions were very small. The outlier statistics did not detect these three firms as outliers, so they were included in the analysis. 24 To detect outliers, the deviation of the residual, the leverage and influence of the observation were considered (Baum, 2006: section 5.2.10). Nature Group PLC and Providence Resources PLC were consistently detected and therefore left out of the analysis. 25 We performed several robustness checks. More information is available on request. Concerning endogeneity,
we expect it to be minor. The abnormal returns (i.e. changes in the firms' expected profitability) as well as the independent variables are in relative rather than absolute terms. During the small event window, unobserved heterogeneous factors from the error term (e.g. productivity levels) are therefore unlikely to have changed and thereby impacted the abnormal returns via the covariates. Furthermore, the event was not anticipated (cf.
endnote 5) and it was not induced by firms themselves, but by the EU Member States release of emissions information.
